Moving to Molotschna 7

The previous post in this series listed five reasons that Mennonites gave for their desire to emigrate to Russia in the years around 1820. According to J. A. Duerksen (1955, 79), those reasons were the following:

1. They were pauperized by the Napolenoic [sic] wars.
2. They had no prospects to improve their lot in Prussia.
3. They had no opportunity to become landowners in Prussia.
4. Russia offered them about 160 acres to a family while in Prussia they were allotted only about 40 acres to a family.
5. Their Russian relatives praised Russian condi­tions and urged them to come to Russia, also.

We should no doubt view this list as Duerksen’s distillation of a variety of reasons offered; although it is doubtful that any one Mennonite gave all of these reasons, the list offers a fairly full, and logically arranged depiction of the general situation that led the Przechovka Mennonites to seek to emigrate. We will explore each reason in turn in order to deepen our understanding of that situation.

1. The effects of the Napoleonic wars

Without diving too deeply into nineteenth-century European history, it is crucial for us to understand a few basic facts about the geopolitics of the day. The French Empire, led by Napoleon after his rise to power during and following the French Revolution, engaged in a series of wars with its neighbors between the years 1803 and 1815. Although the United Kingdom was the most frequent adversary of the French, the wars (plural) were waged by seven coalitions against the French that included nations other than the British. Most important for our purposes were the coalitions that involved the Prussians.

Of particular importance for our interests are the Fourth Coalition and its war during 1806–1807, the Sixth Coalition (1812–1814), and the Seventh Coalition (1815). Not only was Prussia involved in each one of these wars, which in itself affected all of Prussia’s subjects, including the Mennonites, but in several cases armies of several hundred thousand men both crossed through and waged war on the formerly Polish territory (now part of Prussia), which left many of the residents plundered and devastated.

C. F. Plett’s history of the Krimmer Mennonite Brethren, for example, reports anecdotally about one Prussian Mennonite of this time period: 

Anna Wiens had migrated to Russia in 1825 at the age of fifteen, and had gone through many hardships and privations. She and her parents came from Marienburg, Prussia, where they had been well-to-do dairy farmers until they were plundered of all their possessions during the Napoleonic Wars. (Plett 1985, 13)

Although we have no way of verifying the details of this particular account, the story was no doubt true not only for the Wiens family but for many other farmers, Mennonite or not, living in the former Polish kingdom.

In addition to the direct effects of the wars being waged in their presence and the losses suffered at the hands of the troops passing back and forth over their fields, the Mennonites of Prussia also faced increased pressure to forsake their historical commitment to nonresistance and to become combatants in the contest with the French imperial forces.

Peter J. Klassen writes:

The pressure to conform to national military practices was intensified when Prussia became involved in the Napoleonic Wars. Mennonite leaders tried to respond in a positive way by pledging to give the king 30,000 thalers; on 23 November 1806, they gave the king 17,000, then proceeded to collect the rest. … As the wars continued, the situation in Prussia became increasingly difficult. When the government placed an assessment on farms in the Werder [the Vistula marshlands east of Danzig], the Mennonite churches decided to pay an additional voluntary sum of 10,000 thalers to support the king. (Klassen 2009, 178)

However, even this level of financial support was not enough.

New difficulties arose when Napoleon’s forces invaded Prussia, and Prussian authorities ordered immediate formation of the militia and summoned all able-bodied men to join it. There was to be no exemption. Mennonite leaders said they would serve as firefighters, medical orderlies, and in other ways help the war effort, but they could not take up arms. In response, the government said it would accept 25,000 thalers and 500 horses from the Mennonites. … The more well-to-do Mennonites now extended loans to families unable to meet their share of the payment, and the financial demands were met. When only 300 horses were provided, an additional levey of 14,000 thalers was imposed and paid. …

In addition, Mennonites were required to perform support services such as caring for the cavalry and helping transport supplies and foodstuffs. … As the war dragged on, the changing military configurations repeatedly led military commanders to insist that the Mennonites be prepared at least to join the Landsturm, the civilian militia designed as a last desperate line of defense. Again, Mennonite leaders appealed to the king, and again the king agreed that the Mennonites should be exempt from bearing arms but decreed that they should make contributions to the military that would be the equivalent of actual personal military service. Local military authorities were empowered to determine what that would be. (Klassen 2009, 178–79).

The pressures on the Mennonites only intensified as the wars dragged on. It is little wonder, then, that the very next sentence in Klassen’s narrative mentions an unsurprising outcome: “In consequence of this decision [that the Mennonites must make contributions], applications for emigration visas increased dramatically” (Klassen 2009, 179).

The picture painted by Klassen (whose book I highly commend) is consistent with Duerken’s reason: the Mennonites suffered under a significant financial burden during the years of the Napoleonic wars, 1803–1815, which left many of them pauperized. Thus it is no surprise to learn that those seeking to emigrate to Russia gave this reason on their visa applications.

However, this is not the entire story; Klassen’s evaluation of the effects of the Napoleonic wars does not end with the financial strain that the wars brought. He adds:

The years of the war in the early nineteenth century, including the desperate situation of the Prussian state and the ravages of occupation by foreign troops, left Mennonites in the Vistula Delta with a legacy from which they never fully recovered. Although they had contributed funds, horses, food, and clothing, their neighbors increasingly insisted that no amount of material help could take the place of having sons serve to protect the homeland.  (Klassen 2009, 180, emphasis added)

Klassen’s discussion centers on the experiences of the Werder (Vistula Delta) Mennonites who lived east of Danzig, and thus 50 miles north of the Przechovka church, but the experiences of the Schwetz-area church that is the subject of our interest no doubt mirrored those of their coreligionists to the north. 

Although they do not reference it on their visa applications, the Przechovka church members who emigrated to New Russia after the Napoleonic wars did so not only out of financial distress but also, it seems, to escape the increasing demands that the men of their community take up arms in defense of the Prussian state. The Napoleonic wars thus provided a double motivation for wanting to leave Prussia for the more welcome context of New Russia, a motivation that was both financial and faith-based, as life often turns out to be.

The next post in this series will pick up with the second reason given, that the Mennonites had no realistic chance of improving their financial lot in Prussia.

Works Cited

Duerksen, J. A. 1955. Przechowka and Alexanderwohl: Beginnings of Alexanderwohl, Tabor,  Hoffnungsau and Other Churches. Mennonite Life 10:76–82. Available online here.

Klassen, Peter J. 2009. Mennonites in Early Modern Poland and Prussia. Young Center Books in Anabaptist and Pietist Studies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Plett, C. F. 1985. The Story of the Krimmer Mennonite Brethren Church. Winnipeg: Kindred.